Tighter Price Cap Regulation on Consumer Surplus and Utility by Chun-Hung Chen & Ting-Kun Liu
Tighter Price Cap Regulation on Consumer Surplus and
Utility 
Chun-Hung Chen Ting-Kun Liu
Department of Accounting, Chaoyang University of
Technology, Wufong, Taiwan 413.
Department of Finance, Chaoyang University of
Technology, Wufong, Taiwan 413.
Abstract
Kang, Weisman, and Zhang (2000) demonstrated that, under a tighter price cap, consumer
welfare increases with the independence of demands. Conversely, the tighter price cap may
negatively impact consumer welfare in situations involving interdependent demands. This
paper identifies an overlooked property of Kang et al. (2000), namely, that the cross-price
effects should be symmetrical without an income effect and demand functions of a Hicksian
type. This paper reveals the invariant conclusion that consumers always benefit from a tighter
price cap. Besides, it further derives the effects of the tighter price cap on consumer utility,
and concludes that the net price elasticity of demand is the key to the effect of the average
revenue constraint.
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1. Introduction 
Kang, Weisman, and Zhang (2000) adopted a unique  price regulation to 
demonstrate that consumer welfare, in terms of consumer surplus, cannot be 
increased by tighter price caps given interdependent demands. Conversely, it was 
also argued that, under a tighter price cap, consumer welfare increases with the 
independence of demands.
1 However, their model contains a hidden property. 
When this hidden property is revealed, their model invariably concludes that 
consumers always benefit from such a tighter price cap policy. Furthermore, 
unlike Kang et al. (2000) this paper considers how a tighter price cap affects 
consumer utility given different revenue constraint settings. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Kang et al. (2000) considered a price cap on a monopoly of two related products, 
1 Q  and  2 Q . The consumer demand for each product depends on the price of 
that product ( i P ) and the price of the other product ( j P ) in a linear function: 
j i j i P b P a Q j i i i i i ≠ = + − =   and   1,2 ,   for   , α .       ( 1 )  
The coefficients  i α  and  i a  must be positive, but  i b  can have any value 
provided that  0 > > i i b a , meaning that the own-price effect must exceed the 
cross-price effect in terms of absolute value. The price cap  P  is defined as the 
weighted average of the two prices: 
∑ = =
2
1 i i iP w P ,                       ( 2 )  
where  i w   is the weight governed by  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ i w  and ∑ = =
2
1 1
i i w .  
Based on this set up, through profit maximization subject to the price cap of 
Eq. (2) for the optimal prices, the consumer surplus (CS) may be calculated from 
the demand functions for Eq. (1) using the optimal prices as follows: 
= CS , ) , ( ) , ( 2 2 1
ˆ
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1  Law (1995) demonstrated that, given independent demand, a tightening average revenue 
constraint can reduce the consumer surplus in situations where marginal costs differ between 
products. 
   2
where  1 ˆ P  and  2 ˆ P  are reservation prices.  Kang  et al. (2000) identified the 
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.  (4) 
Since the denominator of Eq. (4) is always positive based on the 
second-order condition of profit maximization, the welfare effect depends 
entirely on the sign of the numerator. Subsequently, three scenarios are sorted 
from this equation depending on whether  0 = i b ,  0 ≠ i b  or  0 < i b  (Kang et 
al., 2000, Proposition 2). Among these scenarios, only the first one delivers an 
unambiguously negative derivative. Meanwhile, the other two scenarios are 
inconclusive, and Kang et al. (2000) concludes that consumers may not benefit 
from a tighter price cap regulation. 
 
3. The Revision and Proof of the Kang et al. (2000) Model 
The areas in which the method used in the handling of the model of Kang et al. 
(2000) are lacking are presented as follows: “The model should have symmetric 
cross-price effects without income effects”. When exhibiting voluntary behavior, 
consumers make a utility maximization decision. “If a consumer does not exhibit 
voluntary and rational behavior, the consumer surplus has no meaning.” In other 
words, based on the meaning of the consumer surplus, a consumer must be able 
to make voluntary choices (i.e., consumer utility maximization). In particular, 
when each consumer maximizes utility in a complete market, and each consumer 
faces the same prices, this model can be described using a representative 
consumer.
3 Let  i H  denote the Hicksian demand for goods  i. The expenditure 










































.         ( 5 )  
The first and fifth equalities follow from the lack of income effects. Meanwhile, 
the second and fourth equalities follow from the property of the expenditure 
function. Moreover, the third equality follows from  i P P E ∂ ∂ / ) ( a n d  
i j P P P E ∂ ∂ ∂ / ) (
2
  being continuous at points  i P  and  j P  in the linear demand 
                                                 
2  The variable Qi is lacking in the model of Kang et al. (2000), and can thus be omitted; however, 
this omission does not affect either their or our conclusion. 
 
3  Details of the proof of the inference can be found in Appendix A.   3
functions.  
To sum up, as the model abstracts itself from the income effects (Kang et al., 
2000), then the postulated demand functions are of the Hicksian type (Varian, 
1992). Accordingly, the cross-price effects must be equal, namely: 
b b b = = 2 1 .                        ( 6 )  
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Q 0 < .         ( 7 )  
Based on the assumption that provides a basis for Eq. (1)  0 > > b ai , this 
derivative of Eq. (7) is always negative, and a tighter price cap always increases 
the consumer surplus. This conclusion holds even when both products are 
complementary, that is, if  0 < b  ( cf. Kang et al., 2000, Proposition 2 [iii]). 
Consequently, the change in consumer welfare owing to a tighter price cap 
depends less on whether the demands are independent or interdependent than on 
the nature of the interdependence. Since the model ignores the income effect, the 
interdependence is symmetric. Thus, the model has the invariant conclusion as 
expressed in Eq. (7). 
 
4. The Effects of a Tighter Price Cap on Consumer Utility 
Evaluating the consumer’s utility is more straightforward than evaluating the 
consumer surplus in multi-product circumstances. The next question to be asked 
concerns the effect of a tighter price cap on utility. Let  ) , ( M P V  denote the 
indirect utility function, where  P  is an n×1 vector of price and  M  is the 
fixed amount of money available to a representative consumer.   
First of all, in a lagged revenue (non-contemporaneous) weight constraint 
setting, this paper pays attention to cases where the price cap is binding, i.e., 
∑ = =
n
i i iP w P
1 , for  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ i w  and ∑ = =
n
i i w
1 1, where  P  denotes the price 
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.                             ( 8 )  
This analysis demonstrates that the indirect utility is non-decreasing with a 
tighter price cap, regardless of the cross-price effects. 
Next, in an average revenue constraint (contemporaneous weight) setting, 





i P Q Q P ) / (
1 1 ∑ ∑ = = = . In the case involving independent demand, the 
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.            ( 9 )  
This analysis demonstrates that the sign of the derivative of the utility with 
respect to this price cap is ambiguous.  We further consider that the cross-price 
effects of the demand function are zero; in other words, the consumers’ demands 
are all independent. The effect of the derivative of the utility with respect to the 
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where  i ε =










−  denotes the net price (the individual price minus 
the price cap) elasticity of demand. The indirect marginal utility of income is 
non-decreasing in  M . Three possibilities exist: (1) If all values of 1 minus the 
net price elasticity of demand share the same sign and  0 1 > − i ε   ∀ i, then the 
consumer utility is non-increasing in  P .  (2) If all values of 1 minus the net 
price elasticity of demand share the same sign and  0 1 < − i ε   ∀ i, then the 
consumer utility is non-decreasing in  P . (3) If not all values of 1 minus the net 
price elasticity of demand share the same sign, then the sign of the derivative of 
the utility with respect to the price cap is ambiguous. This implies that a tighter 
price cap may reduce indirect utility, and that the net price elasticity of demand is 
the key to the effect of the average revenue constraint.   
 
5. Conclusion 
Kang  et al. (2000) showed that, with a tighter price cap, consumer welfare 
increases if demands are independent. Conversely, a tighter price cap may reduce 
consumer welfare in situations involving interdependent demands. However, the 
cross-price effects should be symmetrical without income effects and Hicksian 
type demand functions. This paper draws the invariant conclusion that consumers 
always benefit from a tighter price cap. In addition, this paper further derives the 
effects of the tighter price cap on consumer utility. First, in a lagged revenue 
(non-contemporaneous) weight constraint setting, this paper demonstrates that 
indirect utility is non-decreasing with a tighter price cap regardless of the 
cross-price effects. Finally, in an average revenue constraint (contemporaneous 
weight) setting, the paper finds that a tighter price cap may reduce indirect utility, 
implying that the net price elasticity of demand is the key to the effect of the 
average revenue constraint. 
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Appendix A 
When each consumer maximizes utility and is subject to budget constraints: 





i i  
i m X P X P t s
i i = + 2 2 1 1 . .,  f o r   i=1, 2,…,N .         ( 1 1 )  
Here  ) , ( 2 1
i i i X X U   expresses the utility function of consumer i , 
i X1  
represents the demand for the first goods of consumer  i, 
i X2  is the demand for 
the second goods of consumer  i, 
i m is the income of consumer  i, and  N  
represents the number of consumers. Then, a representative consumer exists with 
the maximization of utility and a budget constraint: 
∑
=
+ + + = =
N
i
N i i i
Q Q U U U X X U Q Q U
1
2 1








i m Q P Q P t s
1
2 2 1 1 . . , for  i=1, 2,…, N .                  ( 1 2 )  








1 2 2 . As market demand is the summation 
of each consumer’s demand, this statement can be confirmed by proving that the 
optimal solution for a representative consumer is equal to the sum of the optimal 
solution for each consumer. 
 
Proof:  
Denote the Lagrangian function of Eq. (11) by: 
L
i ) ( ) , ( 2 2 1 1 2 1
i i i i i i i X P X P m X X U − − + = λ , for i = 1, 2,…, N .   (13) 
By partially differentiating L
i with respect to 
i i X X 2 1, , the first-order conditions 
are as follows: 























































λ λ λ L . (14) 























































λ λ λ L . (15) 
Then, the summations for each consumer from Eq. (14) and Eq. (15) are: 














0 λ ;                  ( 1 6 )    7














0 λ .                  ( 1 7 )  
Denoting the Lagrangian function of Eq. (12) by: 
L ) (









i X P X P m U λ . 
and partially differentiating L with respect to  2 1, Q Q , the first-order conditions 
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∂ ∑ =                        
=   0 ,                                ( 1 9 )  




1λ λ . Eq. (16) is equal to Eq. (18), and Eq. (17) is equal to Eq. 
(19). Hence the optimal solution for a representative consumer equals the sum of 
the optimal solution for each consumer.
4 
Q.E.D. 
                                                 
4 Here, the first-order conditions are utilized to confirm this inference. The second-order 
conditions are also derived in this paper and the analytical results are consistent with the 
inference. However, due to the space limitations, the derivation of the second-order conditions is 
not presented in this paper. 